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Abstract - This article describes an innovative system to 
protect offshore oil infrastructure against maritime piracy. 
To detect and respond efficiently to this threat, many 
factors must be taken into account, including the potential 
target, the protection methods already in place and 
operational and environmental constraints, etc. To 
improve the handling of this complex issue, we have 
designed a system to manage the entire processing chain; 
from threat identification to implementation of the 
response. The system implements Bayesian networks in 
order to capture the multitude of parameters and their 
inherent uncertainties, and to identify and manage 
potential responses. This article describes the system 
architecture, the integrated Bayesian network and its 
contribution to response planning. 
Keywords: Maritime piracy, Oil platforms, SARGOS, 
Bayesian networks, International Maritime Organisation, 
Expert knowledge. 
1 Presentation of the SARGOS system 
1.1 Context 
 Offshore oil extraction currently accounts for about 
one-third of global oil production. Despite its scarcity, this 
source of energy is under active exploration in many parts 
of the world, notably in hazardous territorial waters such as 
the Gulf of Guinea, and particularly off the Nigerian coast.  
 Since 2005, the number of acts of piracy against oil 
fields and especially ships has grown steadily (in 2011, 552 
attacks on ships and platforms were registered with the 
International Maritime Bureau
1
). Attacks on infrastructure 
generate significant additional costs arising from the 
payment of ransoms, the installation of security equipment, 
and increased insurance premiums, etc. These additional 
costs directly affect the international price of oil [1] and [2]. 
Although attacks on oil platforms are less frequent and 
certainly less publicised, they are extremely disturbing 
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 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime 
Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (http://www.icc-ccs.org) 
because of the severe impact on the crew (personnel may be 
taken hostage, injured or even killed), infrastructure 
(facilities may be damaged or destroyed), the economy 
(price spikes) and the environment (oil spills). The lack of 
effective tools for infrastructure protection means that 
actors involved in the offshore oil and gas industry find 
themselves helpless. One example is the attack on the 
Exxon Mobil platform [3] off the coast of Nigeria, which 
led to the kidnapping of nineteen employees and extensive 
damage to the facility caused by the explosive devices used 
by the pirates. Such incidents are prime examples of the 
weaknesses in current anti-piracy systems. At the present 
time, oil installation security is provided by so-called 
classical tools (radio identification, radar, Automatic 
Identification Systems, etc.), which, despite their usefulness 
in detection, cannot provide a response tailored to different 
types of threats (fishing boat, jet ski, etc.). Moreover, their 
effectiveness depends on many parameters related to both 
the environment and technical and operational constraints.  
1.2 SARGOS objectives 
 To meet this new need for the protection of civilian 
infrastructure, the French National Research Agency 
(ANR) has funded the SARGOS
2
 system. The project is 
approved by French regional bodies and brings together a 
multi-disciplinary consortium
3
 of partners with 
complementary skills. The aim is to design a system to 
improve infrastructure protection and offer a new method 
that is able to both detect threats and plan a response 
because at the present time, there is no comprehensive 
system capable of managing the entire threat processing 
chain. 
                                                           
2 Graduated Offshore Response and Alert System (Système 
d'Alerte et de Réponse Graduée OffShore). 
3 The SARGOS project includes participants from private sector 
organisations such as DCNS (a French naval shipbuilder) and 
SOFRESUD (a supplier of high-tech equipment to the defence 
industry), and public research centres including ARMINES (a 
French contract research organisation) and TéSA 
(Telecommunications for Space and Aeronautics). 
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 To achieve this, the system must be capable, in the 
case of a confirmed intrusion, of generating an alarm and 
initiating an internal and external response appropriated to 
the danger level of the situation. This response has to be 
implemented through a graduated series of non-lethal 
counter-measures (sonic cannons, barring infrastructure 
access, etc.). 
1.3 System architecture 
 The SARGOS system architecture consists of two 
major sub-systems. First, a module for the detection, 
tracking and classification of threats in the marine 
environment: using powerful instrumentation (FMCW
4
 
radar, infrared cameras, etc.) the SARGOS system can 
identify a potential intrusion and generate an alert report 
that provides an inventory of all the relevant parameters 
necessary to characterise the threat. And a module to 
formalise and model graduated responses: taking into 
account the evolution of the situation, regulatory constraints 
and the operational infrastructure, the data contained in the 
alert report just described is used to define an appropriate 
response to deter or repel attackers.  
 The functional diagram of the SARGOS system 
demonstrates this threat processing cycle (Figure 1). 
 
 Figure 1. Functional diagram of the SARGOS system 
 The safety and security of the infrastructure is assured 
by the application of a response plan generated by the 
system, which triggers a series of progressive and reversible 
actions and reactions. 
2 Contribution of a Bayesian network 
Actually, the great weakness in this process lies in the 
preparation of the diagnosis used for planning the response. 
To overcome this shortcoming, we propose a new approach 
that is able to generate automated response plans, tailored 
to the nature of the detected intrusion. 
2.1 Why a Bayesian network?  
A detailed investigation of the issues highlights 
significant constraints that the SARGOS system must take 
into account in order to fully reflect the complexity of a 
situation [4]. On the one hand, the large number of 
variables to be included (representing the threat, the target, 
                                                           
4 Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave  
the environment, etc.) and the dependencies that may exist 
between them suggest the development of a decision 
support system based on graph theory. On the other hand, 
the uncertainty inherent in certain variables (threat 
identification, intervention options, etc.) emphasises the 
need for a system based on probability theory and 
probabilistic calculations [5]. With these two approaches in 
mind, a process for the automatic preparation of response 
plans tailored to the nature of the detected intrusion, based 
on Bayesian networks was explored [6] and [7]. 
We focus particularly on the contribution of Bayesian 
inference techniques that are applied to, on the one hand, a 
maritime database and on the other to expert knowledge in 
the domains of offshore oil and maritime safety. Data from 
the database and expert knowledge are modelled using 
Bayesian networks, tools based on Thomas Bayes’ theorem 
(1).  
P(B/A) P(A) 
P(A/B) = ―――――          (1) 
P(B) 
 
The theorem is used in statistical inference to update 
probability estimates from observations and the probability 
distributions applicable to these observations. A Bayesian 
network represents knowledge in a way that makes it 
possible to calculate conditional probabilities [8]. Widely 
used for diagnosis (medical or industrial), Bayesian 
networks capitalise and exploit knowledge, and are 
particularly suitable for capturing and reasoning with 
uncertainty inherent in many complex problems [9], [10] 
and [11]. 
2.2 Software used 
Among the existing softwares specialised in Bayesian 
networks, it was decided to choose the Bayesia software 
series which proposes on one hand an intuitive desktop 
solution that experts have easily learned to use in a very 
short time and on the other hand an Application 
Programming Interface (API) which can include a 
previously created Bayesian network into a standalone 
module. 
Indeed, BayesiaLab5 software was first used to 
automatically generate an initial network (from existing 
piracy data) by suggesting dependencies between the 
principal variables [12]. The software was used again in the 
second stage (by experts) to determine the complete 
architecture of the final SARGOS network (cf. §2.3). 
This desktop version was then used to test the results 
of the model developed using simulated scenarios. Thanks 
to the graphical interface, experts can create realistic attack 
scenarios by determining the modalities of their choice. The 
                                                           
5 BayesiaLab software is developed by the French company 
Bayesia (http://www.bayesia.com/) 
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Bayesian network then calculates the resulting probabilities 
which are analysed by the experts to improve iteratively the 
initial modalities and probabilities (cf. §3.2). 
Finally, the API provided by the Bayesia software 
series provides an efficient tool to operate an existing 
Bayesian network automatically and integrate it in a 
standalone system, making so possible a real-time use (cf. 
§3.3). 
2.3 Implementation method 
The approach used to construct the SARGOS 
Bayesian network consists of two complementary steps. 
First, an initial Bayesian network was constructed using 
data from the ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery database’ of the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO
6
). This is the 
only database in existence that holds historic records of 
pirate attacks in the maritime environment. On 15th July, 
2011 the database contained records of 5,502 attacks 
(dating back to 1994) and the data noted for each attack 
included: the name of the asset under attack, the number of 
attackers, the weapons used, the measures taken by the crew 
to protect themselves, the impact on the crew and the 
pirates, etc. 
This approach served two purposes: first, it made it 
possible to determine the principal tools and measures used 
by the crew to protect themselves, to evaluate their 
effectiveness and to define the probability of certain types 
of attack; and secondly it helped to define an initial 
framework for the formalisation of knowledge related to 
acts of maritime piracy.  
The second step leveraged expert knowledge in the oil 
and safety domains. As the information contained in the 
IMO database related primarily to attacks on shipping, the 
contribution of knowledge from domain experts made it 
possible to extend the system to include oil fields [13]. 
Using the Bayesian network created from the IMO data, 
experts were able to share and transfer knowledge that was 
then used to build the final Bayesian network and complete 
the architecture in order to make it as versatile as possible 
(nodes and arcs were added, modalities and probabilities 
were modified) [14]. In this way, the data extracted from 
the IMO database was combined with the experience of 
experts, through the course of multiple brainstorming 
sessions, in order to address the a priori lack of knowledge 
and experiential feedback. 
Furthermore, in future, we could also imagine improve 
our specific knowledge. Once SARGOS systems will be 
operational on several platforms or offshore infrastructures, 
all events which will be treated will come enrich a database 
of existing cases. From this historical data and continuous 
real-time flow of data, it would be possible to define 
datamining rules in order to discover new knowledge [15]. 
These rules will supply an automated reasoning rule-based 
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knowledge to allow the automatic identification of 
abnormal behavior of vessels typical of a risk of maritime 
piracy attack. 
3 Results and integration in the 
SARGOS system 
3.1 Model developed 
The basic architecture of the SARGOS response 
planning network consists of four modules and five sub-
modules (Figure 2).  
The modules are: Basic parameters; Aggravating 
factors and constraints; the Overall danger level of the 
situation; the Countermeasures. Basic parameters are static 
or dynamic physical data that characterise the threat and the 
target. They are either obtained directly from the alert 
report or are derived from it. Aggravating factors make it 
possible to take into account the potential deterioration of 
the situation, while constraints are parameters that must be 
taken into account to ensure the effectiveness of the 
response both technically and operationally. The overall 
danger level of the situation is derived from the basic 
parameters. Its assessment takes into account the potential 
consequences of the problem created by the threat and the 
vulnerability of the target. Countermeasures are all the 
defences implemented by the target in order to return as 
quickly as possible, and in the best condition possible, to a 
safe situation. Countermeasures are classified into five sub-
modules according to the danger level of the situation and 
the operational availability of on-board equipment.  
These sub-modules are: Communication and distress 
calls; Deterrence and low-impact repulsion measures; 
Repulsion, anti-boarding and neutralisation measures; 
Procedure management; Ensuring the safety and security of 
the facility. From these sub-modules, the Bayesian network 
proposes a set of countermeasures that may be activated 
according to the estimated danger level (for example: 
activate the safety system and silent alert, etc.).  
 
 Figure 2. Functional diagram of the SARGOS system 
The planning report generated by the network makes it 
possible to make a rational assessment of probabilities and 
formalises expert knowledge. This report constitutes the 
interface between the processing of the alert report and 
exploitation of the results of the Bayesian network. It is a 
summary of the essential information needed to actually 
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trigger response procedures. Consequently the probability 
of activating a particular countermeasure will obviously 
vary according to the situation. 
3.2 Simulation of attack scenarios 
Once the probability distribution of the various 
modalities has been established, an interesting exercise is to 
test the Bayesian network by using it to simulate different 
attack scenarios through the selection of certain criteria. An 
examination of these scenarios made it possible to finalise 
the network before integrating it into the SARGOS system. 
The example below (Figure 3) shows how response 
planning is tailored to the danger level of the situation and 
can adapt to changes in parameters representing the threat 
and the target. Specifically, it shows the results of setting 
parameters to simulate an attack on a Floating Production, 
Storage and Offloading (FPSO) unit by an unknown vessel. 
This example shows that the danger level of the situation, at 
time T1, was 2 with a 64.68% probability of occurrence. In 
this case the counter-measures to be applied were: inform 
the crew master, request the intervention of the security 
vessel, broadcast a strong message by loudspeaker, turn on 
the searchlight and activate the security post. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of response planning as more 
information about the situation becomes available 
At time T1+t the attacker has been identified as hostile 
and equipped with a highly maneuverable boat. The 
parameters that impacted response planning were: the 
ranking between the threat and the target (i.e. the time 
required for the threat to cover the remaining distance to the 
target), the distance between the threat and the target and 
the response time of the security vessel. The danger level is 
now 4 with a 79.79% probability of occurrence. This higher 
level requires a more forceful response, reflected in the 
recommended measures: assemble the crew, secure the 
installation and block access to sensitive areas.  
The creation of attack scenarios makes it possible to 
refine the probability of an attack and test the response of 
the Bayesian network by changing the parameters that 
represent the threat, the target, the environment, etc. 
3.3 Integration of the Bayesian network into 
the SARGOS system 
In order to integrate the Bayesian network into the 
SARGOS system, a prototype was developed that included 
an alert report as input and a planning report (which listed 
all the counter-measures to be applied either by the crew or 
automatically by the system) as output. The BayesiaEngine 
software provides a module that makes it possible to select 
and set attack parameters. This module consists of an 
application programming interface (API) and a Java library. 
Intermediate calculations are carried out on the basis of 
these parameters and the results are fed into the enhanced 
Bayesian network created from expert knowledge.  
The resulting list of counter-measures varies 
according to the attack scenario. Consequently, a threshold 
must be set in order to only activate those measures that 
provide the most relevant response at a particular time, and 
in a particular situation. This threshold was set at 70%. In 
other words, only those counter-measures where one of the 
modalities had a probability greater than 70% were selected 
for further processing. This threshold was arrived at by 
domain experts as it reflects actual events in more than two-
thirds of real-life cases. Following an extensive period of 
testing, the selected counter-measures were found to 
correspond to realistic and reliable responses. 
The SARGOS system can handle multiple threats 
contained in a single alert report. Consequently, priorities 
must be established. In the system, the first threat to be 
treated is always the one where time available to react is the 
shortest for the target that is most exposed. Figure 4 shows 
the user interface of the SARGOS system, and demonstrates 
how multiple threats can be processed simultaneously. 
In this example, the system has detected several 
potential threats heading towards the oil field and has 
classed them into ‘Enemy’, ‘Unknown’ or ‘Friend’. An alert 
is only generated following a classification of Enemy or 
Unknown.  
Once a threat has been detected and analysed, the 
counter-measures are selected and added to the response 
planning report prepared in a specific order. The main 
factors determining this order of priority were: the action 
mode of the counter-measure, its ease of implementation, 
the degree of automation or the need for a large number of 
crew members to activate it, the time required for it to 
become effective and its potential additional functions. 
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 Figure 4. The user interface of the SARGOS system 
showing threat prioritisation 
The planning report is divided into two parts: the first 
concerns communication and a general request for 
assistance directed at the entire oil field; the second 
concerns the specific asset at risk. The response planning 
report also displays the counter-measures to be activated in 
chronological order.   
 Figure 5. The SARGOS user interface showing global 
(left-hand side) and specific (right-hand side) 
countermeasures to be deployed 
In the above example (Figure 5) the global counter-
measures are, in order: inform the crew master, request the 
intervention of the security vessel and broadcast 
information about the attack to other installations in the 
field. The specific measures are: assemble the crew, block 
access to the infrastructure, activate searchlights and 
activate the noise cannon (Long Range Acoustic Device; 
LRAD). The representation of the probability that a 
particular measure will be implemented can be seen in the 
counter-measure ‘Security Vessels’, where the proportion 
of the blue segment suggests a 60-70% probability that this 
method will be called upon. 
4 Conclusions 
 Response planning in the SARGOS system results in 
the preparation of a response planning report based on an 
intelligent assessment of the alert report. The response 
planning report includes all the information necessary for 
the physical implementation of measures to protect against 
a threat. 
 Using a Bayesian network for response planning is a 
major benefit of the SARGOS system as the network is able 
to manage all possible interactions between threat 
characteristics, the target, the environment, the crew and the 
facilities. It can adapt to real-time changes in the danger 
level of the situation.  
 Network scalability is also made possible through 
integration of feedback related to the processing of attacks 
previously managed by the system. The planning module 
can therefore be updated and improved iteratively.  
 Finally, in order to improve the modeling of 
knowledge embedded in the Bayesian network, an 
interesting approach would be to draw upon an appropriate 
ontology [16]. The use of a suitable ontology would make it 
possible to formalise knowledge upstream of the Bayesian 
network in order to consolidate the steps of threat detection 
and identification. 
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